

January 5, 2005, Kjell Hausken

## Appropriative conflict and war

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Room To be announced  
Time Z-day 12.15-16.00  
Credit points: 4  
Admission: To be announced

### Course objectives

The purpose of the course is to expose you to appropriative conflict and war. The course is organized into 13 weeks. The first two weeks introduce and consider sources of military conflict and settlement. Thereafter come two weeks with philosophy of war; Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. These are followed up with two weeks on war and military combat, and thereafter one week on armament, expansion, and deterrence. The next two weeks focus on the proprietary state, and thereafter one week on anarchy, tyranny, revolution, rival rulers. Then we focus on civil conflict and civil war, and we conclude the last week with war and morality. The course exposes you to a broad range of issues relevant for understanding and appraising appropriative conflict and war. Each topic is typically presented from different and often diametrically opposite viewpoints prevalent in contemporary research. The course trains you to make consciously intelligent and scientifically justifiable stands within each sub-field, and contributes to your ability to organize these stands into a coherent whole.

### Course requirements

Each student will write a 3 pages double-spaced (say 600 words) essay due in class every week, starting the second week. Write concisely. I do not want to read a superfluity of sesquipedalian obfuscatory prolixity. You can take stands on the issues, but you need to justify them. You will be evaluated on your command of the material, and on the comprehension you reveal of the major factors relevant for each week's topic. Every week 2-4 of you will present your essays in class. Assignments will be arranged on the first week of class ensuring that the major viewpoints of each topic get presented. These essays to be presented are to be provided to me (or someone to be assigned the task) at 11 a.m. the day before every class. They will be copied, and can be picked up by all other students two hours later outside office zzz. With less than 15 students, the course will be run as an informal lecture/discussion course. With more than 20 students, a larger auditorium will be assigned, and the course will be held in a more formal lecturing tone. Each student will write a final paper, due Thursday of exam week at 4 p.m. in my

mailbox in zzz. The paper should be 12-20 pages, double-spaced, and on a topic relevant for the course. Please come and see me if you want to discuss your topic, or if you want me to suggest possible topics for you. You will be evaluated 50% on your essays, 30% on your final paper, and 20% on your oral presentation including how well you withstand critique from the other students and myself. Office hours are Wednesdays 12.15-14.00 in zzz.

## **Course schedule**

### **1. week: Introduction**

A presentation of the course, including a 3-5 minutes description of each of the course's topics. Assignment of students to topics to be presented in class.

### **2. week: Sources of military conflict and settlement**

Gunderson, G. (1974), "The origin of the American Civil War," *J. of Econ. Hist*, 34, 915-950.

Wittman, D. (1979), "How a war ends," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23, 743-763.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1989), "The contribution of expected-utility theory to the study of international conflict," Ch. 6 in Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*, U. of Michigan Press.

Hirshleifer, J. (1991), "The Paradox of Power," *Economics and Politics* 3, 177-200.

Cederman, L.E. (1994), "Emergent polarity: Analyzing state-formation and power politics," *Intl. Studies Quarterly*, 38, 501-533.

### **3. week: Philosophy of war**

Clausewitz, C.V. (1832), *On War*, Princeton University Press, 1984.

4. week: Philosophy of war

Tzu, Sun (-320), *The Art of War*, translated by Griffith, S.B., Oxford University Press, London, 1971.

### **5. week: War**

Hausken, K. and Moxnes, J.F. (2000), "The Microfoundations of the Lanchester War Equations," *Military Operations Research* 5, 3, 79-99.

Hausken, K. and Moxnes, J.F. (2001), "Behaviorist Stochastic Modeling of Instrumental Learning," *Behavioural Processes* 56, 2, 121-129.

Hausken, K. and Moxnes, J.F. (2002), "Stochastic Conditional and Unconditional Warfare," *European Journal of Operational Research* 140, 1, 61-87.

Lanchester, F.W. 1916. *Aircraft in Warfare: the Dawn of the Fourth Arm*, Tiptree Constable and Co. Ltd. Extract reprinted in James R. Newman, ed., 1956, *The world of mathematics* (Simon and Schuster, New York) 4, 2138-2157.

### **6. week: Military combat and war**

Alesina, A. and Spolaore, E. (2005), "War, Peace, and the Size of Countries," *Journal of Public Economics*, forthcoming.

Brackney, H. (1959), "The dynamics of military combat," *Operations Research*, 7, 30-44.

- Cederman, L.E. (2003), "Modeling the size of wars: from billiard balls to sandpiles," *American Political Science Review*, 97, 1,135-150.
- Epstein, J.M. (1985), "The calculus of conventional war: Dynamic analysis without Lanchester theory," Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Lepingwell, J.W.R. (1987), "Laws of combat," *International Security*, 12, 89-134.
- McGuire, M.C. (1992), "The new strategic environment and economic factors in the future of nuclear defense," in W. Isard and C. H. Anderton, eds., *Economics of Arms Reduction and the Peace Process*.
- Wolfson, M., Gutierrez, S., Traynor, J. and Smith, R. (1992), "Competing optima in the Gulf War," in Isard & Anderton, eds, *Economics of Arms Reduction and the Peace Process*, Elsevier, New York.

### **7. week: Armament, expansion, and deterrence**

- Findlay, R. (1996), "Towards a model of territorial expansion and the limits of empire," in M. R. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas, *The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation*, Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Intriligator, M.D. and Brito, D.L. (1984), "Can arms races lead to the outbreak of war?," *J. of Conflict Resolution*, 28, 63-84.
- Jervis, R. (1976). "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary," in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, 58-113.
- Richardson, L.F. (1939), "Generalized Foreign Politics," *The British Journal of Psychology*, Monograph Supplement II 23.

### **8. week: The proprietary state I**

- Grossman, H.I. (2002) "'Make Us a King': Anarchy, Predation, and the State," *European Journal of Political Economy*, 18, 1, 31-46.
- Grossman, H.I. (2000), "The State: Agent or Proprietor?" *Economics of Governance*, 1, 1. 3-11.
- Grossman, H.I. and Noh, S.J. (1990), "A Theory of Kleptocracy with Probabilistic Survival and Reputation," *Economics and Politics* 2, 2, 157-171
- Grossman, H.I. and Noh, S.J. (1994), "Proprietary Public Finance and Economic Welfare," *Journal of Public Economics*, 53, 287-204.
- Skaperdas, S. (2003). "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from its Governance," *Economics and Politics*, 135-162.
- Teng, J. (2000), "Endogenous Authoritarian Property Rights," *Journal of Public Economics*, 77, 1, 81-95.

### **9. week: The proprietary state II**

- Acemoglu, D. (2003), "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics," *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31, 620-652.
- Brezis, E.S. and Schnytzer, A. (2003), "Why are the Transition Paths in China and Eastern Europe Different? A Political Economy Perspective," *Economics of Transition*, 11, 1, 3-23.
- Fan, C.S. and Grossman, H.I. (2001), "Incentives and Corruption in Chinese Economic Reform," *Journal of Policy Reform*, 4, 195-206.

- Mulligan, C.B., Gil, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X (2004), "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18, 1, 51-74
- Padró i Miquel, G. (2004), "Captured by the Government: Ethnic Divisions and Political Accountability," Manuscript, MIT.

### **10. week: Anarchy, tyranny, revolution, rival rulers**

- Duffy, J. and Kim, M. (2005), "Anarchy in the Laboratory (and the Role of the State)" in *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, forthcoming.
- Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. (2001), "Cooptation and Repression in the Soviet Union," *Economics and Politics*, 13, 1, 31-47.
- Grossman, H. (1999), "Kleptocracy and Revolutions," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 51, 267-283.
- Grossman, H. (1995), "Rival Kleptocrats: The Mafia versus the State," in G. Fiorentini and S. Peltzman, (eds.), *The Economics of Organized Crime*, Cambridge University Press.
- Hirshleifer, J. (1995), "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," *Journal of Political Economy* 103, 1, 26-52.
- Kuran, T. (1989), "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," *Public Choice*, 61, 41-74.
- Usher, D. (1989), "The dynastic cycle and the stationary state," *Am. Ec. Rev.*, 79, 1031-1044.

### **11. week: Civil conflict**

- Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. (2000), "Civil Conflict: Ended or Never Ending?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44, 6, 807-821.
- Gershenson, D. (2002), "Sanctions and Civil Conflict," *Economica*, 69, 185-206.
- Grossman, H.I. (2004), "Constitution or Conflict?" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21, 1, 29-42.
- Caselli, F.G. and Coleman, J. (2002): "On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict." Working paper, Harvard University.
- Easterly, W. and R. Levine, (1997), "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, CXII, 1203-1250.

### **12. week: Civil war**

- Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002), "Greed and Grievance in Civil War" Working paper, CSAE, WPS/2002-01.
- Collier, P. and Sambanis, N. (2002, eds.), *Journal of Conflict Resolution: Special Issue on the Economics of Civil War*, February 2002, 46, 1.
- Deininger, K. (2003), "Causes and Consequences of Civil Strife: Micro-level Evidence from Uganda," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 55, 579-606.
- Fearon, J.D. (2003), "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8, 2, 195-222.
- Fearon, J.D. and Laitin, D.D. (2003), "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, 1, 75-90.

- Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., and Sergenti, E. (2004), "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," *Journal of Political Economy*, 112, 4, 725-553.
- Sambanis, N. (2002), "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War," *Defense and Peace Economics*, 13, 2, 215-243.
- Sambanis, N. and Elbadawi, I. (2002), "How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, 3, 307-334.

**13. week: War and morality**

- Hausken, K. (1995c), "Krieg, Ethik und Politiken," *Berliner Debatte INITIAL: Zeitschrift fuer Sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskurs* 6, 79-88.
- Walzer, M. (1977), *Just and Unjust Wars*, Basic Books.